๐ชช IAM Review Checklist
Intro: This checklist focuses on human and non-human access, trust policies, privilege boundaries, and the path by which powerful actions happen.
Best time to use this checklist
Use it for new roles, service accounts, federation trust, break-glass paths, admin workflows, and platform changes.
Stop-the-line conditions
- wildcard or broad admin privilege without strong business justification;
- long-lived static credentials for automation where federation is possible;
- unclear mapping between identity, owner, and purpose;
- transitive trust that lets one compromised system pivot into another.
Text-first review prompts
- Which actor or workload identity is using this permission?
- Is the privilege scoped to specific resources, actions, and environments?
- What trust assumption lets this identity exist or assume a more powerful role?
- How short-lived is the credential material?
- What logs prove that the identity acted, and what alerts watch for misuse?
- What would an attacker gain if this identity were compromised?
Evidence table
| Control area | What to verify | Typical evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Identity purpose | Every identity has a clear owner and business purpose | IAM inventory, owner mapping |
| Privilege scope | Permissions are limited to required actions and resources | policy review, diff |
| Trust | Federation, assume-role, and service-account trust is understood | trust policy, OIDC config |
| Credential lifetime | Short-lived credentials are used where possible | STS config, token lifetime |
| Detection | Use of privileged identities is logged and monitored | audit logs, detections |
Common misses
- reviewing permissions without reviewing trust relationships;
- ignoring who can edit the role instead of who can use the role;
- failing to separate development and production authority;
- forgetting that an overpowered CI identity is often a production risk, not only a build risk.
Related pages
- Workload Federation and Non-Human Identities
- Cloud Change Review Checklist
- Provider-Specific Cloud Attack Chains
---Author attribution: Ivan Piskunov, 2026 - Educational and defensive-engineering use.